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LANHAM ACT PROTECTION FROM THE
COPYING OF TRADE DRESS BY GENERIC
DRUG MANUFACTURERS
Manufacturers of generic drugs1 often copy the appearance, or trade
dress, of a generic drug's name brand counterpart.2 The copying of trade
dress has increased dramatically due to the recent proliferation of
generic substitution laws.' Generic substitution laws decrease the cost of
prescription drugs by allowing dispensing pharmacists to substitute a
generic drug for the name brand drug.' To prevent improper substitu-
tion, manufacturers of name brand drugs5 seek protection under the
Lanham Act (Act)6 from the copying of trade dress.7 The Act protects
manufacturers against misidentification of trademarks8 by providing for
A generic drug has the same ingredients and dosage as a drug originally introduced
by another manufacturer. Rogers & Kahan, Recent Developments Regarding Look-Alike
Drugs, 35 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 4, 4 n.1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Recent Develop-
ments]. The manufacturer of the generic drugs may identify the drug to doctors, phar-
macists, and consumers by its generic name which indicates the chemical class to which
the drug belongs or may identify the drug by a trademark or a brand name. Note, Con-
sumer Protection and Prescription Drugs: The Generic Drug Substitution Laws, 67 Ky.
L.J. 384, 388 (1978-79) [hereinafter cited as Generic Substitution Laws].
2 See H. L. Swenson, Property Rights in the Color and Shape of Capsules, FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 361, 361 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Property Rights] (Manufacturers have copied
competitors' products for centuries).
3 Prior to 1977, manufacturers of name brand drugs sought protection against copying
of trade dress only in a few instances. See Property Rights, supra note 2, at 362-66. Since
1977, however, manufacturers of name brand drugs have sought protection against the
copying of trade dress in a number of instances. E.g., Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug
Co., 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981); SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625
F.2d 1055 (3rd Cir. 1980); Hoffman La Roche, Inc. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories,
Inc., 502 P.T.C.J. (BNA) A-4 (D.N.J. 1980); Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne
Laboratories, 502 P.T.C.J. (BNA) A-1 (D.N.J. 1980); A.H. Robins Co. v. Medicine Chest
Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
Between 1972 and 1979 thirty-one states and the District of Columbia adopted generic
substitution laws. Generic Substitution Laws, supra note 1, at 395.
' Generic Substitution Laws, supra note 1, at 388-89; see, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 4047.6 (West Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6E-7 & -8 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 6816-a (McKinney Supp. 1980). See note 1 supra.
I Name brand drug refers to a drug of a particular chemical class well known in the
prescription drug market by the name under which the manufacturer markets the drug.
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1132 (1976).
' See, e.g., SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3rd
Cir. 1980); Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979); A. H.
Robins Co. v. Medicine Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
e A trademarket includes any combination of words, names, symbols or devices
adopted and used by a manufacturer to identify his goods and distinguish them from those
manufactured or sold by others. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976). Ownership rights in a trademark ac-
crue only through open use of the trademark to further the marketability of a product. The
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registration and a federal cause of action for unfair competition.' Name
brand drug manufacturers seeking protection under the Act argue that
the courts should grant trademark protection for the trade dress of
name brand prescription drugs due to the particular nature of the
prescription drug market.0 Manufacturers of generic drugs, however,
argue that the public policy demand for low prescription drug prices
which supports generic substitution laws also supports the copying of
the trade dress of a generic drug's name brand counterpart. Generic
drug manufacturers argue that consumers will refuse generic drugs and,
therefore, lose the benefit of lower prices if generic drugs do not copy
the appearance of name brand drugs.11
The peculiar misidentification problems of the prescription drug
market result from the consumer's deference to the greater skill and
knowledge of a physician. 2 Normally, a consumer chooses to purchase a
product after examining the product and its packaging. A consumer of
prescription drugs, however, receives a drug only after a physician
manufacturer or merchant must adopt the trademark in good faith. Needle, A Patent and
Trademark Primer, 15 GA. B.J. 58, 60 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Trademark Primer].
' Manufacturers or merchants of goods sold or shipped in interstate commerce or sub-
ject to federal regulation may register the goods' trademark in the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office under the provisions of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976); Trademark Primer,
supra note 8, at 60. Section 32 of the Act provides protection for registered trademarks. See
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976); text accompanying notes 20-21 infra. Section 43(a) of the Act pro-
vides some protection for unregistered trademarks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976); text ac-
companying note 26 infra. The federal courts have jurisdiction in actions pursuant to the
Act without regard to the amount in controversy or diversity of citizenship. 15 U.S.C. §
1121 (1976); Trademark Primer, supra note 8, at 60.
"0 See Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538, 541 (2d Cir. 1981);
SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1059 (3rd Cir. 1980);
Hoffman La Roche, Inc. v. Premo, 502 P.T.C.J. (BNA) A-i, A-i, A-2 (D.N.J. 1980); Boeh-
ringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Laboratories, 502 P.T.J.C. (BNA) A-i, A-1, A-2
(D.N.J. 1980).
" Cooper, Trademark Aspects of Pharmaceutical Product Design, 70 THE T.M. REP. 1,
28 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Pharmaceutical Design]; see SK&F, Co. v. Premo Phar-
maceutical Laboratories, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1184, 1188 (D.N.J. 1979), affd, 625 F.2d 1055 (3rd
Cir. 1980) (court rejected argument that generic drug laws require copying of trade dress so
patients will not reject cheaper generic drugs clearly differing in appearance); Hoffman La
Roche, Inc. v. Premo, 502 P.T.C.J. (BNA) A-4, A-6 (D.N.J. 1980) (court found unpersuasive
argument that copying of trade dress required to avoid upsetting patients who receive
generic substitutes); Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Laboratories, 502
P.T.C.J. (BNA) A-1, A-2 (D.N.J. 1980) (court rejected defendants' assertion that copying of
trade dress fills both purpose and spirit of generic substitution laws); A.H. Robins Co. v.
Medicine Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015, 1020 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (public policy underly-
ing generic substitution laws not offended by requiring generic drugs to differ in trade
dress).
1 Misidentification problems in the over the counter drug market differ from misiden-
tification problems in the prescription drug market. The consumer of over the counter
drugs may examine the drug's packaging before purchasing. The consumer of prescription
drugs, however, only receives the drug and the packaging in which the dispensing phar-
macist places the drug.
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prescribes the drug 3 and a pharmacist dispenses, labels, and packages
the drug. Misidentification problems may occur when a pharmacist
substitutes a generic drug for a prescribed name brand drug. The phar-
macist may inadvertently label the generic drug as the name brand drug
or may fail to notify the consumer of the substitution,14 as required by
most generic substitution laws.15 The pharmacist may also attempt to
"'pass off" the generic drug as the name brand drug. Passing off the
generic drug entails knowing substitution of the generic drug at the
name brand price without notifying the consumer.'" The consumer,
therefore, receives a generic drug thinking he has received a name
brand drug. Misidentification violates the consumer's right to informed
consent to generic substitution1 ' and may subject the manufacturer of
the name brand drug to liability if the bioavailability"8 of the generic and
name brand drugs differ."
, Generic Drug Laws and Unfair Competition Claims Under the Lanham Act-An
Uneasy Alliance: Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 227, 244
(1980).
" See Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co. 601 F.2d 631, 636 (2d Cir. 1979). The
Ives court labeled cases of inadvertent misidentification as "intermediate." Id.
"5 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4047.6 (West Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
24:6E-7 & -8 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6816-a (McKinney Supp. 1980).
" See SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1063 (3rd
Cir. 1980) (unscrupulous pharmacists guilty of passing off when they substitute less expen-
sive generic for name brand drug without informing consumer or passing along lower cost);
Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 636 (2d Cir. 1979) (most serious case
of actionable misidentification occurs when pharmacist fills prescription for name brand
drug with generic drug and labels prescription as name brand drug).
The First Restatement of Torts defines passing off as fraudulently marketing one's
goods or services as those of another. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 711(a) (1938); see SK&F, 625
F.2d at 1062.
17 The informed consent doctrine requires that a physician disclose to the patient the
reasonably foreseeable risk and benefits of a procedure and any potentially advantageous
alternative procedures. Pharmaceutical Design, supra note 11, at 33.
One court suggested that informed consent is impossible if there is covert substitution
of a look-alike drug. See SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 481 F.
Supp. 1184, 1190 (D.N.J. 1979), affd, 625 F.2d 1055 (3rd Cir. 1980); Pharmaceutical Design,
supra note 11, at 33. The trial court in SK&F stated that manufacturers should not expose
consumers to the unknown risk of having a prescription filled with an allegedly "generic
equivalent:' 481 F. Supp. at 1190. Many generic substitution laws reflect the requirement of
informed consent by reouiring notification of a substitution. See note 15 supra.
" The bioavailability of a drug is a measure of the rate a drug absorbs into the blood
stream, an index of the drug's medical efficacy. 481 F. Supp. at 1190; STEDIMIAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 173 (4th unabr. Lawyer's Ed.).
" The Third Circuit in SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc. noted
that a manufacturer of a name brand drug might be exposed to liability if a patient unknow-
ingly received a generic substitute. The court suggested that a patient might react differ-
ently to the generic if the generic and name brand drug were not bioequivalents. SK&F
would be unable to prove that the patient took a generic drug if the prescription required
the name brand drug and the patient had taken all of the drug. SK&F, Co. v. Premo Phar-
maceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1066 (3rd Cir. 1980). For a discussion of
equivalency problems resulting from varying bioavailability of name brand and generic
drugs see Generic Substitution Laws, supra note 1, at 392-95.
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The Act, in two separate sections, provides manufacturers of name
brand drugs with protection from the copying of trade dress by generic
drug manufacturers. Section 32 of the Act protects against unfair com-
petition by prohibiting both infringement and contributory infringement
of a registered trademark." Trademark infringement occurs when a per-
son manufactures or sells a colorable imitation of a registered trademark
without the consent of the registrant.21 To prove trademark infringe-
ment the plaintiff must show that consumers are likely to confuse the
imitated and registered trademarks.' Contributory infringement occurs
when a person intentionally aids another in infringing upon a registered
trademark.' A manufacturer is liable for contributory infringement if
the manufacturer knowingly produces a product so similar to a product
produced by another that the similarities enable a retail dealer to pass
the product off as the original. A manufacturer also is liable for con-
tributory infringement if the manufacturer encourages passing off.2
Section 43(a) of the Act provides broader protection than section 32
against unfair competition.' Section 43(a) protects both registered and
unregistered trademarks against unfair competition that occurs in the
form of false designation of origin or false description or representation
of the goods.28 Proof of section 43(a) unfair competition requires a show-
ing that the copied feature is nonfunctional and has acquired a secondary
' 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976). Section 32 of the Act provides that:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-(a) use in commerce
any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in
connection with the sale.., of any goods ... with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.., shall be liable in a civil action by
the registrant...
Id. See also Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 636 (2d Cir. 1979)
(discussing copyright infringement action pursuant to § 32 of the Act).
2, See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (5th ed. 1979).
See 2 J. MCCARTY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23.1 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as MCCARTY].
I See id. at § 25.2; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (5th ed. 1979); text accompanying
notes 54-55 infra.
24 MCCARTY, supra note 22, § 25.2.
1 Trademark infringement is part of the broader law of unfair competition. Facts sup-
porting an action for infringement under section 32 of the Act also would support an action
for unfair competition under section 43(a) of the Act. See James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of
the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976); Heaton Distributing Co. v. Union Tank
Car Co., 387 F.2d 477, 483 (8th Cir. 1967).
' 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976). Section 43(a) of the Act provides that:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods ...
a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation ... tending
falsely to describe or represent the same.., shall be liable to a civil action ... by
any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damages by the use of any
such false description or representation.
Id. See also Trademark Primer, supra note 1, at 60 (section 43(a) provides some protection
for unregistered trademarks).
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meaning. A nonfunctional feature serves no purpose other than identifi-
cation.' A feature of goods has acquired secondary meaning if the
feature causes the prospective purchaser to regard the goods as uniquely
those of the initial distributor.' Courts, however, do not require show-
ings of nonfunctionality and secondary meaning to enjoin the sale of
imitations if the manufacturer of the imitation engaged in the predatory
practice of encouraging passing off."
In two recent cases, courts protected manufacturers of name brand
drugs from the copying of trade dress by generic drug manufacturers
under the Act. In Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co.,3 the Second
Circuit protected a name brand drug manufacturer under section 32 of
the Act. 2 In SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc.,"
the Third Circuit protected a name brand drug manufacturer against un-
fair competition under section 43(a) of the Act. 4
In Ives, the plaintiff, Ives Laboratories (Ives), manufactured and
marketed a prescription drug under a registered trademark." The defen-
dants manufactured or marketed the generic drug in capsules of the
same dosages and trade dress as the drugs produced by Ives." Ives
brought an action charging the defendants with contributory infringe-
ment in violation of section 32 of the Act and false designation of origin
" See Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 5.
28 SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d at 1063; RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 742 (1938).
2 See SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d at 1063;
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 741(b)(c) (1938).
See Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 6.
81 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'g, 488 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), on remand from,
601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979).
= 638 F.2d at 540, 543.
625 F.2d 1055 (3rd Cir. 1980), affd, 481 F. Supp. 1184 (D.N.J. 1979).
Id. at 1057. Three district courts have addressed the issue of unfair competition
under section 43(a) of the Act since SK&F. In each case, the court enjoined the defendant's
copying of trade dress based on section 43(a) by relying upon a standard to infer passing off
similar to the standard used by the Third Circuit in SK&F. See Boehringer Ingelheim
G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Laboratories, 502 P.T.C.J. (BNA) A-1, A-2 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1980);
Hoffman La Roche, Inc. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 502 P.T.C.J. A-4, A-6
(D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1980); A.H. Robins Co. v. Medicine Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015,
1019-21 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (defendants created situation where they knew or should have anti-
cipated passing off through copying trade dress). See also text accompanying note 69 infra
(SK&F's standard for showing of passing off under section 43(a) of Act).
" 601 F.2d at 634. Ives manufactured and marketed cyclandelate under the registered
trademark "Cyclospamol." Id
I Ives markets a 200 milligram dosage of "Cyclospasmol" in blue capsules and a 400
milligram dosage in red and blue capsules, both imprinted with the word "Ives." Id The
defendants manufactured or marketed generic cyclandelate in 200 and 400 milligram cap-
sules in colors essentially identical to the capsules in which Ives markets "Cyclospasmol."
Id. at -635. Defendant Premo began imprinting "Premo" on the generic cyclandelate it
markets in June, 1978. Prior to that time, none of the defendants imprinted any mark on the
generic cyclandate the defendants marketed. See id.
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in violation of section 43(a) of the Act. 7 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York denied a preliminary injunction.'
In Ives I, the Second Circuit upheld the denial of a preliminary
injunction. 9 The Second Circuit remanded, however, setting forth the
standards applicable under sections 32'0 and 43(a)"1 of the Act to prevent
manufacturers of generic drugs from copying the trade dress of name
brand drugs. On remand, the district court applied the standards
developed in Ives I and denied Ives permanent relief.2
On appeal after remand in Ives II,'3 the Second Circuit reversed. The
Ives II court held that the defendants' manufacturing and marketing of
the generic drug with a trade dress identical to the name brand drug
constituted contributory infringement in violation of section 32 of the
Act." The Ives II court noted that the defendants could reasonably an-
See id. Ives also charged the defendants with unfair competition under New York's
common and statutory law. Id. The Ives I court stated that the Second Circuit defined the
requirements for a showing of unfair competition under New York Law in Flexitized, Inc. v.
National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913
(1965). 601 F.2d at 644. In Flexitized, the Second Circuit noted that actionable unfair com-
petition under New York law entails the misappropriation of the trademark of another even
where the trademark has not acquired a secondary meaning. 335 F.2d at 781-82.
See Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939, 952 (E.D.N.Y. 1978),
affd, 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979).
" Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1979) (Ives I).
The Second Circuit noted that the district court had not abused its discretion. Id.
41 See text accompanying notes 53-54 infra.
4 601 F.2d at 642-43 (Ives I). The Ives I court indicated that section 43(a) requires a
showing that the feature is nonfunctional and has acquired a secondary meaning. Id The
court indicated that it would assume nonfunctionality of trade dress unless the defendants
demonstrated that the copying of the competitor's trade dress served a number of
utilitarian purposes essential to effective competition. Id- at 643. The court also noted that
the case for nonfunctionality depends on evidence offered by defendants that Ives' chosen
trade dress serves several utilitarian purposes essential to effective competition. Id The
Ives I court should have established a standard implying liability under section 43(a) of the
Act similar to the standard used by the SK&F court. See text accompanying notes 80-83 in-
fra. Implication of passing off under section 43(a) of the Act is proper due to the peculiar
nature of the prescription drug market. See text accompanying note 72 infra.
" Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 488 F. Supp. 394, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). The
Ives I court instructed the district court to apply the standards developed in Ives L 601 F.2d
at 644.
Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 540, 545. Ives produced fifteen instances of improper substitution at its first
trial. 601 F.2d at 636. The fifteen instances were cases of primary infringement. See 638
F.2d at 543. Primary cases of infringement occur when the physician prescribed a name
brand drug but the pharmacist fills the prescription with the generic drug and labels the
prescription as the name brand drug. Primary cases of infringement are the most serious
cases of infringement. See 601 F.2d at 636 (Ives I). The Ives I court noted that a trial court
could reasonably conclude that fifteen instances of primary infringement did not justify a
holding of contributory infringement under section 32. The court, therefore, affirmed the
denial of a preliminary injunction. Id. at 634.
On remand from Irves I, Ives introduced additional evidence of intermediate cases of in-
fringement discovered through two surveys. 638 F.2d at 543. The Ives I court defined "in-
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ticipate that a substantial number of pharmacists would pass off the
generic drug as the name brand drug." The court noted that the produc-
tion of generic drugs with trade dress identical to name brand drugs was
a suggestion to pharmacists to pass off the generic as the name brand
drug."8 The court also noted that the defendants suggested passing off
by distributing catalogues comparing the prices and the similarity in ap-
pearance of the generic and name brand drugs."' The Ives II court, grant-
ing an injunction based on section 32 of the Act, indicated that the court
did not need to consider Ives' allegations that the defendants violated
.section 43(a) of the Act. 8
The generic drug manufacturers in Ives argued that the public
policy supporting generic substitution laws required that generic drug
manufacturers copy the trade dress of a generic drug's name brand
counterpart.'9 The Ives H defendants also argued that look-alike cap-
sules reduce a patient's confusion and anxiety about taking a generic
substitute and that look-alikes aid in identification of the drug in
emergency situations.' The Second Circuit rejected the defendants' con-
fusion and anxiety arguments. The court noted that a difference in trade
dress would not increase a patient's anxiety if the dispensing pharmacist
followed the laws and accepted professional practice relating to notifica-
tion of the patient upon generic substitution. 1
Prior to Ives II, no federal court had prohibited the copying of a
prescription drug's trade dress based upon contributory infringement
under section 32 of the Act. The Second Circuit's holding in Ives II
establishes a new avenue for manufacturers of name brand drugs in sec-
termediate cases" as those cases in which the prescription permits substitution and the
pharmacist substitutes a generic for the name brand drug without notifying the consumer.
601 F.2d at 636. The Ives II court noted that the district court erred by failing to give any
weight to the additional evidence introduced by Ives. The Ives II court held that the addi-
tional evidence introduced by Ives clearly was sufficient to establish contributory infringe-
ment under section 32 of the Act. 638 F.2d at 543 (Ives II).
In the first of Ives' two surveys, test shoppers presented prescriptions for
"Cyclospasmol" that permitted substitution at forty-two drug stores selected from a list of
drug stores believed to carry both "Cyclospasmol" and generic cyclandelate. Six of the eigh-
teen pharmacists who dispensed the generic product mislabeled the generic product by in-
cluding "Cyclospasmol" on the label. In the second Ives' survey, Ives' test shoppers sub-
mitted the same prescription to 41 pharmacists selected at random. Four of the seventeen
pharmacists that dispensed the generic product in the second survey mislabeled the generic
product by including "Cyclospasmor' on the label. 638 F.2d at 543; 488 F. Supp. at 397.
638 F.2d at 542-43.
IML at 543.
Id at 539-40. The Second Circuit remanded from Ives II for consideration of other
remedies. Id at 540 n.3.
See 638 F.2d at 544-45.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 544-45. The Ives II court rejected the defendant's argument that copying trade
dress would help officials identify drugs in emergency situations. See id at 544.
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tion 32 to prevent manufacturers of generic drugs from copying trade
dress.52 The Ives I court set out a standard that indicates a manufacturer
or wholesaler is liable for contributory infringement if he suggests or im-
plies that a retailer fill a prescription with a generic drug and apply the
corresponding name brand drug's trademark to the label.3 The Ives I
court also indicates that a manufacturer or wholesaler is liable under sec-
tion 32 if the manufacturer or wholesaler sells generic drugs to a phar-
macist that the manufacturer or wholesaler knows or has reason to know
engages in passing off. 4 The Second Circuit, however, was unclear about
what type and how much evidence would establish contributory infringe-
ment.55
" See Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 7. (Ives I differs from previous look-alike
cases holding that court can find imitator of name brand drug liable for contributory in-
fringement under § 32 of the Act).
601 F.2d at 636 (Ives 1).
54 Id.
I In Ives I, the Second Circuit considered the fifteen instances of improper substitu-
tion which Ives introduced at trial and held that the trial court was justified in concluding
that Ives failed to adduce the quantum of proof necessary to establish contributory infringe-
ment under § 32 of the Act. 601 F.2d at 636; see note 44 supra. On remand to the district
court, Ives introduced "additional evidence of 'intermediate cases' of contributory infringe-
ment" derived from two marketing surveys. Although the district court found the addi-
tional evidence insufficient to establish a section 32 violation, the circuit court in Ives II held
that the additional evidence clearly was sufficient to establish contributory infringement
under section 32 of the Act. 638 F.2d at 543; see note 44 supra. The court noted that the pat-
tern of illegal substitution and mislabeling is precisely the sort of showing which the court
held in Ives I would be "probative of a plaintiffs § 32 claim." Id at 538.
The Ives II holding, however, fails to clearly establish what minimum quantum and
type of evidence will establish a § 32 violation in the future. The difficulty in discerning a
standard for the future stems from the Ives II court's failure to indicate whether the court
relied on the additional evidence introduced on remand as merely adding to the quantum of
proof of contributory infringement and thereby establishing a section 32 violation in con-
junction with the fifteen instances of improper substitution introduced in the first trial, or
whether the court viewed the additional evidence as a different type of evidence and relied
on it as independently establishing a section 32 violation.
If the court viewed the additional evidence as establishing a section 32 violation only in
conjunction with the previously introduced fifteen instances of improper substitution, it is
unclear why the court required the additional evidence of "intermediate" cases of con-
tributory infringement at all. Ives introduced only ten instances of contributory infringe-
ment. Courts consider cases of intermediate contributory infringement less severe viola-
tions than the violations represented by the original fifteen instances of improper substitu-
tion. See 638 F.2d at 543; note 44 supra. Therefore, the additional evidence of intermediate
cases of contributory infringement added little of substance to the original fifteen cases of
improper substitution. See 638 F.2d at 546 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). Additionally, because
courts consider cases of contributory infringement less severe than the primary cases of
contributory infringement demonstrated by the fifteen instances of improper substitution,
and because the fifteen instances of improper substitution were insufficient to sustain a sec-
tion 32 violation, the intermediate cases cannot independently support a section 32 viola-
tion. The Ives II court's emphasis on the additional evidence of intermediate cases of con-
tributory infringement is confusing for future plaintiffs seeking section 32 relief.
Ultimately, the emphasis accorded by the Ives II court to the intermediate cases of
contributory infringement may be due to the source, rather than the nature, of the informa-
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Manufacturers of products other than generic drugs are liable for
contributory infringement under section 32 of the Act if they encourage
passing off or produce a product so similar to a product produced by
another that the similarities enable a retailer to pass off the product.8
The Second Circuit's standard in Ives for contributory infringement
under section 3211 is consistent with decisions holding manufacturers
liable for contributory infringement if they encourage passing off. The
Second Circuit correctly indicated that encouraging passing off includes
both a suggestion by a manufacturer of generic drugs that a pharmacist
pass off the generic as well as the sale of the drug to a pharmacist known
to be guilty of passing off. The court, however, may have limited im-
properly the application of contributory infringement by requiring a
showing of actual instances of passing off. Under the Act, the manufac-
turer of a generic drug that copies the trade dress of a corresponding
name brand drug should be guilty of contributory infringement per se
due to the peculiar nature of the prescription drug market.58 Per se con-
tributory infringement liability for generic drug manufacturers is consis-
tent with decisions holding manufacturers liable for contributory in-
fringement if they produce a product so similar to a product produced by
another that the similarities enable a retailer to pass off the product.
Since a consumer only receives the drug and the pharmacist's label, an
unscrupulous pharmacist easily could substitute the generic for the
name brand drug if the drugs are identical in appearance. 9
SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc. establishes
an action for unfair competition under section 43(a) of the Act as another
avenue for manufacturers of name brand drugs to prevent manufac-
turers of generic drugs from copying trade dress.5 SK&F Co. (SK&F)
manufactured and marketed a prescription oral diuretic. 1 Premo Phar-
maceutical Laboratories, Inc. (Premo) marketed a generic diuretic in cap-
sules extremely similar to the capsules in which SK&F marketed the
name brand drug.2 SK&F brought suit against Premo alleging patent in-
tion. The Ives I court specifically noted that the intermediate cases derived from the
marketing surveys that Ives conducted in a "rigorous, impartial manner." I& at 543. Future
plaintiffs seeking to establish section 32 violations in the Second Circuit, therefore, should
seek to conduct their own Ives type marketing surveys. See generally note 44 supra.
" McCARTY, supra note 22, § 25.2. See Corning Glass Works v. Jeannette Glass Co.,
308 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (S.D.N.Y.), affd per cur., 432 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1970).
See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
s, The consumer of a prescription drug has no way of knowing if the pharmacist made
a substitution unless the pharmacist so notifies the consumer because the consumer would
receive only the identical generic.
I See Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 7 (Ives I differs from previous look-alike
cases in holding that courts can find imitator of name brand drug liable for unfair competi-
tion under section 43(a) of Act); text accompanying note 65 infra (SK&F holding).
81 625 F.2d at 1057.
See id. at 1057-58. SK&F markets "Dyazide" in half maroon and half white No. 3
hard gelatin capsules with the logos "Dyazide" and SK&F stamped on each half of the cap-
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fringement and unfair competition under section 43(a) of the Act.6 3 The
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. granted a
preliminary injunction against Premo.64 The Third Circuit upheld the
grant of a preliminary injunction under section 43(a) of the Act. 5
The Third Circuit held that passing off one's goods as those of
another as well as unprivileged imitation are actionable torts of unfair
competition under section 43(a) of the Act. 8 The SK&F court indicated
that actionable passing off occurs when manufacturers should reason-
ably anticipate that pharmacists will pass off generic drugs as their
name brand counterpart because of the similarity between the two pro-
ducts. Actionable passing off occurs even if the generic manufacturer
does nothing else to encourage passing off. 7 The Third Circuit's applica-
tion of the standard for a showing of actionable passing off to the facts of
SK&F indicates that the court will presume actionable passing off when
a generic drug manufacturer copies the trade dress of a name brand
drug unless the manufacturer can establish that he was unaware of pass-
ing off by pharmacists.68
The SK&F court noted that the second section 43(a) tort, unprivileged
imitation, requires the name brand manufacturer to show secondary
meaning and nonfunctionality.6 9 Apparently, the court would imply
secondary meaning from an assertion by a generic manufacturer that it
copied that trade dress of the name brand drug so patients and doctors
would associate the generic drug with the name brand drug. 0 The IThird
sules. I& at 1057. Premo markets generic "Dyazide" in half maroon and half white No. 3
hard gelatin capsules with the logo "Premo" stamped on the capsules. Id. at 1058.
See id. at 1057; 481 F. Supp. at 1186.
See 625 F.2d at 1057; 481 F. Supp. at 1187. The SK&F court reserved decision on
SK&F's allegation of patent infringement. 625 F.2d at 1057; 481 F. Supp. at 1187.
" 625 F.2d at 1057, 1068. SK&F presented evidence of a survey showing a 40/ rate of
unlawful substitution and a 230/o rate of illegal mislabeling. Id at 1059.
See 625 F.2d at 1065 (discussing torts of passing off and unprivileged imitation); note
26 supra (language of § 43(a)). The SK&F court noted that § 43(a) has been construed broadly
to proscribe other competitive torts. 625 F.2d at 1065.
"7 The SK&F court relied upon the wording of § 43(a) of the Act which states that a
person is liable for introducing into commerce any words or symbols tending falsely to
describe ones product as that of another. Id.; see note 26 supra. In analyzing § 43(a), the
SK&F court found that § 43(a) proscribes passing off as does New Jersey law. 625 F.2d at
1065. The court stated that New Jersey law requires a finding of passing off when a generic
drug manufacturer places a product in the hands of a pharmacist in a form which enables
the manufacturer reasonably to anticipate that the pharmacist may pass off the generic pro-
duct as the name brand product. Actionable passing off occurs under New Jersey law even
if the generic drug manufacturer does nothing else to encourage passing off. 625 F.2d at
1062.
, See 625 F.2d at 1063 (no suggestion that defendant was unaware of passing off of
defendant's generic look-alike by some unscrupulous pharmacist).
" See id. at 1063, 1065. In analyzing § 43(a) of the Act, the SK&F court found no essen-
tial difference between the tort of unprivileged imitation under New Jersey law and § 43(a)
except the Act's required element of interstate commerce. Id. at 1065.
7 See 625 F.2d at 1063-64; text accompanying note 29 supra. The SK&F court in-
dicated that the defendant's admission that they copied the trade dress of the name brand
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Circuit also indicated that a drug's trade dress is nonfunctional if other
manufacturers successfully market equivalent drugs in a different trade
dress.:1
The SK&F court's prevention of trade dress copying by generic
drug manufacturers was sound. In SK&F, the facts supported a finding
of unprivileged imitation under section 43(a) of the Act because the trade
dress of the name brand drug was nonfunctional and had acquired a
secondary meaning.72 The successful marketing of equivalent drugs of
different trade dress indicated that trade dress was nonfunctional.73 Fur-
ther, the defendant admitted copying trade dress in order to associate
the generic drug with the name brand drug in the mind of the patient
and physician.7 Such an admission was sufficient to indicate that the
trade dress had acquired a secondary meaning in cases like SK&F,
where trade dress is nonfunctional.
7 5
The court in SK&F also properly found the defendants guilty of
passing off.76 The implication of passing off allowed by the Third Circuit
under section 43(a) of the Act is consistent with the exception to the
general rule that requires a showing of nonfunctionality and secondary
meaning for the court to grant protection against unfair competition.
7 7
drug to facilitate association of generic drug with name brand drug by patients and doctors
strongly supports a showing of secondary meaning. See id.
", See id. at 1064. The SK&F court noted that another manufacturer successfully
markets equivalent drugs to SK&F's in orange tablet form. The .court then found trade
dress of name brand product nonfunctional. Id.
7 See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
73 See text accompanying note 71 supra. A nonfunctional feature serves no purpose
other than identification. See text accompanying note 28 supra. If a competitor successfully
markets an equivalent drug of differing trade dress, the trade dress of the name brand drug
is not the only functional trade dress in which a manufacturer can market the drug. A com-
petitor's successful marketing of an equivalent drug of differing trade dress, therefore, is an
indication that the trade dress of the name brand drug is nonfunctional.
The SK&F court noted that of the 25 leading diuretics sold in the United States, the
trade dress of SK&F's product was unique. 625 F.2d at 1059. Further, SK&F successfully
markets the drug in Europe in an orange tablet. Id. at 1057. The court also listed a number
of different drugs manufactured in capsules similar to the capsules in which SK&F markets
"Dyazide." Id at 1060.
" See 625 F.2d at 1060.
," See text accompanying note 70 supra. A nonfunctional feature serves no purpose
other than identification. See text accompanying note 28 supra. If a feature is functional, a
manufacturer intentionally can copy that feature to obtain the commercial advantage that
feature provides. See text accompanying note 37 supra. If a feature is nonfunctional and has
acquired a secondary meaning, however, a manufacturer cannot copy that feature. See text
accompanying note 27 supra. A feature of goods has acquired secondary meaning if the
feature causes the prospective purchaser to regard the goods as those of another. See text
accompanying note 29 supra. Since the defendant in both cases admitted copying the trade
dress of the name brand drug in order to associate the generic drug with the name brand
drug in the mind of the patient and physician, the defendant effectively admitted secondary
meaning.
," See text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
" See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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The exception allows courts to prevent unfair competition without a
showing of nonfunctionality or secondary meaning when the defendant is
guilty of the predatory practice of encouraging passing off.78 The nature
of the prescription drug market makes the copying of the trade dress a
predatory act. A consumer of prescription drugs receives a bottle filled
and labeled by his pharmacist. If a generic look-alike is available, an
unscrupulous pharmacist easily could pass off illegally the identical
generic as the name brand drug.79 The SK&F court, therefore, properly
considered the production of a generic drug of identical trade dress of
the name brand drug an encouragement of passing off.
In Ives II and SK&F, the Second and Third Circuits properly
granted manufacturers of name brand drugs protection under the Lan-
ham Act against the copying of trade dress by manufacturers of generic
drugs. 0 In Ives II, the Second Circuit, however, may have limited section
32 actions too severely by requiring evidence of actual passing off. 1 By
manufacturing a generic drug that looks like a name brand drug counter-
part, generic drug manufacturers enable and encourage pharmacists to
pass off the generic as the name brand drug.2 In future actions under
the Lanham Act, therefore, federal courts should consider the copying of
trade dress by generic drug manufacturers as a per se violation of the
Lanham Act in order to prevent passing off.
8 3
JAMES B. McLAREN, JR.
7' See text accompanying note 30 supra.
The consumer of a prescription has no way of knowing if the pharmacist made a
substitution unless the pharmacist so notifies the consumer because the consumer would
receive only the identical generic.
See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
